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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we focus on the role of caseworkers in the assignment and take-up of welfare-to-work pro-
grams. We conduct a field experiment that generates exogenous variation in the assignment of caseworkers
to different policy regimes. The experiment allows us to provide evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-
to-work programs and to study how caseworkers exploit their discretion in assigning these programs to
welfare recipients. We find substantial heterogeneity in how caseworkers assign welfare-to-work pro-
grams. Participation in the experiment and learning about the effectiveness of the different programs do not
induce caseworkers to focus more on the effective programs. Obtaining knowledge about welfare-to-work
programs is thus not enough to improve policy, also effort on implementation is required.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Randomized control trials (RCTs) are increasingly used to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of active labor market programs. In their 2010
meta analysis on active labor market programs, Card et al. (2010)
report that 10% of the studies use an RCT explicitly designed to empir-
ically evaluate a program. In the 2018 update this increased to 19%
(Card et al., 2018). RCTs solve the problem of selective participation
in active labor market programs and, therefore, are considered to
provide a credible empirical evaluation (e.g. Heckman et al., 1999).
However, using RCTs some problems remain unsolved (Rothstein and
Von Wachter, 2017). For example, the estimated treatment effect is
only policy relevant if program participation can easily be varied,
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which requires that caseworkers have limited discretionary power
when deciding about participation in active labor market programs.
In this paper, we focus on the role of the caseworker in the assign-
ment and take-up of active labor market programs. RCTs assign all
unemployed workers in the treatment group to participate in the
program, but usually ignore the take-up decision. The strict program
assignment rule of an RCT does not concur with the large degree of
discretion which caseworkers have in many countries (e.g. Behncke
et al., 2009, Bell and Orr, 2002, Lechner and Smith, 2007, Schmieder
and Trenkle, 2016, Vikström, 2017).1 The average treatment effect
estimated using the RCT may then not be the most policy rele-
vant treatment effect. While there is quite a lot of recent evidence
on the effectiveness of various active labor market programs, for
example documented in Card et al. (2018), much less is known about
1 Schiprowski (2020) and Rosholm (2014) find that meetings with the caseworker
are important and that there is substantial heterogeneity between caseworkers.
Vikström (2017) refers to a PhD thesis by Eriksson (1997), which shows that case-
worker heterogeneity is more important than heterogeneity among unemployed
workers when assigning active labor market programs. Similar results are reported by
Huber et al. (2017).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104080
0047-2727/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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the motivations and goals of caseworkers (Schmieder and Trenkle,
2016).
This paper contributes to the literature by answering three ques-
tions. First, we investigate the effectiveness of a set of existing active
labor market programs to support welfare benefits recipients and
study heterogeneity in treatment effects on a series of labor market
outcomes. Second, we study how the use of these active labor market
programs varies between locations and caseworkers. In our setting
caseworkers have a limited caseload and meetings with benefits
recipients occur frequently. Caseworkers have an excellent opportu-
nity to gain detailed information about the benefits recipient’s ability
and needs, which would allow them to effectively match benefits
recipients to services (Lechner and Smith, 2007). We relate the use
of active labor market programs to heterogeneity in effects of par-
ticipation in these programs. In addition, we explore if caseworkers
prefer certain programs, which they offer to most of their bene-
fits recipients and if caseworkers which express such specialization
in a particular program obtain better results when providing this
program to a benefits recipient. Third, we study knowledge of case-
workers by investigating if caseworkers change their preferences
for programs after having been exposed to a different (and possi-
bly more effective) way of working and having learned about the
effectiveness of all programs.
We conduct a field experiment covering all new entrants into
welfare benefits (with a potential to work) in Amsterdam in the
period April 2012 to March 2013.2 The field experiment generates
exogenous variation in the assignment to three different welfare-
to-work programs: direct job matching, job-search training and
counseling. We evaluate these programs against two alternatives,
one where the caseworker has full discretion in choosing the pro-
gram which she finds most appropriate and one where the benefits
recipient does not participate in any program. This setup allows us to
evaluate each of the programs against the alternative of no program
and to study what the added value of caseworkers is in selecting an
effective program. In addition, the program choices when the case-
worker has full discretion identify specialization of the caseworker.
We address this specialization and the beliefs about the effective-
ness of the different programs in a survey among caseworkers which
provides insights in learning by caseworkers after having gained
experience with other programs.
Our study relates to a substantial literature evaluating active labor
market programs summarized in Card et al. (2018). Most RCTs focus
on a program additional to the standard support provided to ben-
efits recipients (e.g. Graversen and Van Ours, 2008, Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw, 2006). A unique feature of our field experi-
ment is that we introduce a treatment where no support is given,
which allows us to evaluate the existing programs rather than only
new programs. Our study also relates to the literature on the optimal
assignment of unemployed workers to active labor market programs.
Lechner and Smith (2007) compare caseworker discretion, a statis-
tical treatment rule based on observable participant characteristics
and random assignment to services and find that caseworkers obtain
roughly the same post-program employment rate as the random
allocation, while statistical treatment rules outperform both. Com-
pared to our study, they measure program effectiveness by only
controlling for observed participant characteristics rather than using
exogenous variation from a field experiment. Behncke et al. (2009)
focus on targeting active labor market programs using a large field
experiment in Switzerland. They find that caseworkers ignore the
information of the statistical system which is provided to them and
2 This field experiment was implemented simultaneously with the experiment
evaluating job-search periods prior to entry in welfare benefits which is described in
Bolhaar et al. (2019). The random assignment in both field experiments is orthogonal,
which allows to evaluate them separately.
thus do not change behavior. However, use of the statistical system
was neither encouraged nor monitored. Also, Schmieder and Trenkle
(2016) find that caseworkers do not optimize their behavior when
the length of the entitlement period to unemployment insurance
benefits changes.
For the empirical analysis we combine data from different sources
to construct a very detailed administrative dataset describing the
participants in our field experiment. We observe individual labor
market histories in the years prior to collecting welfare benefits
and have measures of guidance received at the welfare agency such
as meetings with caseworkers and participation in welfare-to-work
programs. After exit from the welfare benefits we observe employ-
ment status and earnings at the weekly level. Our empirical results
show that the effects of the various welfare-to-work programs differ
substantially. Whereas direct matching improves the labor market
outcomes of benefits recipients, participation in job-search activa-
tion has mainly adverse effects. We find only limited evidence for
heterogeneity in the effects of participating in a program and this
heterogeneity only relates to characteristics of the welfare recipi-
ent and not to the caseworker. In particular, caseworkers who use
a particular program very often when having full discretion obtain
the same average effects of this program as caseworker who only
rarely use the same program. Also, we see that local offices adopt
different approaches under full discretion while we find little sup-
port for heterogeneous treatment effects. From this we conclude that
not all caseworkers use their discretion optimally in assigning ben-
efits recipients to programs. This is confirmed by results from our
survey among caseworkers which show that caseworkers do not
easily change their preferences for welfare-to-work programs. The
policy implication is that even if a randomized controlled trial pro-
vides credible evidence on the effectiveness of certain treatments,
the roll-out of such policies is not obvious.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next
section provides details about the welfare system in the Netherlands,
the specific setting of the experiment and describes the role of case-
workers. In Section 3 we explain the experimental design of the field
experiment. Section 4 describes the data and provides evidence on
the randomization and compliance rates. In Section 5 we present the
main results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional background and the role of caseworkers
2.1. Welfare benefits in the Netherlands
Welfare provides benefits to households that do not have enough
income. The benefits level depends on the composition of the
household.3 Monthly benefits range from 668 euro for a single with-
out children, to 1336 euro for a couple with children. In the same
period the net minimum wage was about 1200 euro per month. Indi-
viduals with a (part-time) job earning less than the welfare benefits
level, can receive partial welfare benefits, which complements their
income from work to the welfare benefits level. In that case, the
marginal tax rate for (additional) earnings is 100 %. There is no limit
to the period that households can collect welfare benefits.
Welfare recipients have the obligation to accept any type of
employment, also if it does not fit their education or work experi-
ence. The rules on eligibility for welfare and the level of the benefits
are determined at the national level, but municipalities decide about
welfare-to-work programs and other activation policies for wel-
fare recipients. Individuals have to apply for welfare benefits in the
municipality where they live.
3 Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the different benefits levels by
household composition in the year 2012 (start of our observation period).






Bachelor/master degree 96% 50
Years worked at welfare agency 10.6 50
Being caseworker is first job 23% 44
Ever received benefits 29% 49
Note: The information in this table is based on a survey among the caseworkers that
participated in the experiment. The response rate to the survey is 81%.
2.2. Caseworkers
Welfare applicants in Amsterdam are randomly matched to a
caseworker (within the welfare office), which allows the benefits
agency to benchmark caseworkers against each other.4 Applicants
are supposed to meet their caseworker twice a month. These meet-
ings with the caseworker are not necessarily face-to-face meetings
but can also be phone calls or email contacts. The caseworker sup-
ports the welfare recipient in her job search, can offer participation in
welfare-to-work programs, monitors job-search effort and sanctions
individuals that do not comply with the job-search requirements.5
The welfare-to-work programs are discussed in more detail in the
next section.
During the first meeting the caseworker determines the labor
market prospects of the welfare applicant using a computerized pro-
gram that profiles based on characteristics such as work history, age,
education, language and computer skills, family situation and physi-
cal or psychological problems. This results in a classification into four
classes that determines which type of guidance a welfare benefits
recipient receives and what the obligations of the welfare recipient
are. We focus on class IV, which contains welfare recipients who do
not have work limitations and are considered to be able to find a job
within six months. Welfare recipients in this class have to actively
search for work (typically they are required to make one or two
job applications each week). About 40% of all welfare applicants in
Amsterdam are assigned to class IV.6 Welfare offices have teams of
caseworkers that support only welfare recipients in class IV in their
job search. If the welfare recipient does not find work within six
months, she should be transferred to class III and another team of
caseworkers. In practice, the period in class IV is often extended with
some months.
Table 1 provides characteristics of the caseworkers for the welfare
recipients in class IV. These caseworkers are on average 42 years old,
almost all hold a bachelor and/or master degree and 60% are female.
Average tenure at the welfare agency is long (almost 11 years),
although for only 23% of the caseworkers it is their first job. Finally,
29% of the caseworkers have ever received either welfare or unem-
ployment insurance benefits.
4 Note that we cannot use the average treatment assignment rate of a caseworker
as an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of the treatment, as Maestas et al.
(2013) and Dahl et al. (2014) do. Caseworkers usually interact more with their clients
than judges and may also provide guidance unrelated to the decided treatment. If this
type of guidance is related to how frequent caseworkers choose certain active labor
market programs, the validity of an instrumental variable approach is violated.
5 A sanction generally reduces benefits with 30% for one month.
6 Individuals in the three other classes have a larger distance to the labor market.
Class III individuals should be able to work, but lack some (social) skills and require
guidance to find work and stay employed. These individuals often start working in
a subsidized job. Individuals in class I and II have social problems and/or physical
limitations that make them unfit for work.
Fig. 1. Self-assessed heterogeneity in program choice of caseworkers. Note: data from
post-experiment survey among caseworkers (response rate 81%).
2.3. Welfare-to-work programs and caseworker discretion
A caseworker assigned to class IV can use three programs to
support welfare recipients in their job search. First, they can send
the individual to a job-search activation course. This is an intensive
eight-week program with daily sessions. During the first two weeks
welfare recipients receive job-application training and guidance on
how to find vacancies. During the subsequent six weeks participants
spend a few hours per day in a computer room, where they make
job applications (under the guidance of a trainer). Second, the case-
worker can match the individual directly to a vacancy, which is taken
from a pool of vacancies gathered by a separate unit in the welfare
office. The match is often accompanied by a trial period or a wage
subsidy for the employer.7 Third, the caseworker can apply case-
worker counseling. This includes regular meetings (typically every
other week) in which the caseworker helps the individual with the
job-search process, setting up the C.V., etc. Before our experiment,
the caseworker had full discretion in the assignment of programs
to welfare recipients with the restrictions that direct matching to
vacancies can only be done in case of a suitable vacancy and the
eight-week job-search activation course has entry requirements on
language and computer skills.
The welfare-to-work programs offered by the welfare administra-
tion of Amsterdam are very similar to programs used in many other
municipalities, and also, in other countries. Data from Eurostat shows
that most European countries spend substantial amounts on what
they call client services and employment incentives. The job-search
activation course and caseworker counseling fall in the category of
client services. According to Eurostat expenditures on client services
are highest in Denmark, France, UK, Germany and Sweden. Direct
matching contains most elements considered in employment incen-
tives such as temporary financial incentives to employers. Card et
al. (2010) show that in Nordic countries, but also in Anglo-Saxon
countries a very substantial share of the evaluation studies con-
cern subsidized private sector employment, such as direct matching.
Many of the programs that are evaluated in this literature have
strong similarities with the programs considered in this paper.
In a post-experiment survey, we asked the caseworkers to indi-
cate how much they target programs to welfare recipients. On a zero
to one hundred scale caseworkers answer how much they agree with
two statements (see Fig. 1 for a summary of the answers). The first
question concerned heterogeneity among welfare recipients. Almost
all caseworkers agree that heterogeneity in individual characteristics
is important when assisting welfare recipients. The second question
concerned the choice for welfare-to-work programs. The casework-
ers indicate that they do not apply a uniform policy to support
welfare recipients in their job search.
To investigate further how caseworkers target welfare-to-work
programs to welfare recipients, we asked the caseworkers how they
7 A trial period is a period of one to three months in which a welfare benefits
recipient works for an employer but receives welfare benefits instead of a wage. Trial
periods are aimed at employers that have hesitations about the capability of welfare
benefits recipients and are meant as a possibility for welfare benefits recipients to
prove that they are suitable for the job.










1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Matching Activation
Counseling Nothing
Fig. 2. Frequency of program choices of caseworkers to fictional welfare recipients.
Note: Data from post-experiment survey among caseworkers (response rate 81%).
Caseworkers are asked to state which welfare-to-work programs they use for seven
fictional welfare recipients (numbers on the x-axis), which are described in Table A2
in the Appendix.
would support a number of hypothetical welfare recipients.8 For
example, client number one is ‘a married man of 50 years old with
limited command of Dutch and only a primary school degree’. Fig. 2
shows how many caseworkers would use each of the welfare-to-
work programs to support each of the seven individuals. Three things
are important to note. First, the program which is chosen most often
varies between the seven cases. Second, caseworkers almost always
prefer to provide a welfare-to-work program over having a pas-
sive role and giving the welfare recipient time to search for work
herself. And third, in all cases a substantial number of caseworkers
deviates from the most often chosen welfare-to-work program. The
results confirm that heterogeneity among welfare applicants is taken
into account when offering welfare-to-work programs and show
that caseworkers have different opinions about the most suitable




The field experiment includes five policy regimes.9 For each of the
three welfare-to-work programs, there is a policy regime in which
caseworkers are supposed to assign as many welfare benefits recip-
ients as possible to the specific welfare-to-work program. In the
fourth policy regime, benefits recipients do not receive any guid-
ance from the caseworker and are not supposed to participate in any
welfare-to-work program. This is the control group, which allows
us to evaluate the effectiveness of the three welfare-to-work pro-
grams. In the fifth policy regime the caseworker has the usual (full)
discretion in assigning benefits recipients to the welfare-to-work
programs (or to provide no guidance). With this policy regime we
8 Table A2 in the Appendix provides the details of the hypothetical welfare recip-
ients as they were presented to the caseworkers. These welfare recipients closely
resemble actual applicants for welfare benefits at the time of our experiment.
9 The original design of the experiment, including a power analysis, can be found at
http://personal.vu.nl/b.vander.klaauw/ResearchProposalDWI2012.pdf.
can test whether caseworkers choose the most effective approach for
benefits recipients.
During the experiment, caseworkers are assigned to one of the
five policy regimes. They are asked to treat all new clients they
receive according to the rules of this policy regime for at least
six months. If following the policy regime is inappropriate or not
suitable for the client, caseworkers can ‘opt out’, and use another
program to guide a client back to work. We prefer to randomize pol-
icy regimes rather than participation in a particular welfare-to-work
program. In reality caseworkers always have some discretion or they
will not be able to convince some benefits recipients to participate.
Therefore, policy makers at the welfare agency do not use strict pro-
tocols which impose full compliance, but rather formulate policy
regimes with some discretion for caseworkers. A limitation of our
experimental setting is that in reality policy makers can fully close
down certain welfare-to-work programs, while in our setting all pro-
grams remain existing. The latter makes it easier for caseworkers to
deviate from the rules in a restricted policy regime.
Every three months the policy regime of the caseworker for new
welfare benefits recipients changes. This implies that caseworkers
support benefits recipients in different policy regimes at the same
time, as they have to treat an individual according to the same policy
regime for at least six months.10 Welfare recipients apply at five dif-
ferent locations in Amsterdam, and each location has their own team
of caseworkers. We made sure that in every three-month period each
of the five policy regimes is allocated to at least one member of each
team. At the start of a new three-month period, each caseworker was
instructed by us about her new policy regime.
The five policy regimes are communicated to the caseworkers as
follows:
Counseling Provide counseling to the welfare recipients. Do not
act as an intermediary between vacancies and the welfare recip-
ient and do not offer participation in the job-search activation
program.
Direct matching Try to match the welfare recipient directly to
a vacancy. You can offer a trial period or wage subsidy to an
employer if that helps to establish a match. If there are no appro-
priate vacancies, provide counseling in the meantime. Do not offer
participation in the job-search activation program.
Job-search activation Offer participation in the job-search acti-
vation program to the welfare recipient. Provide counseling if the
welfare recipient lacks the (computer or language) skills to par-
ticipate, is on the waiting list or has completed the program. Do
not act as an intermediary between vacancies and the welfare
recipient.
Nothing Do not use any welfare-to-work program. Do not initiate
contact with the welfare recipient but be available for questions
of the welfare recipient.
Full discretion Choose the program(s) that you think are most
appropriate. So follow your usual approach of supporting the
welfare recipient.
The policy regimes are based on the programs that the wel-
fare agency offered before our experiment. The caseworkers were
thus experienced in the use of each program. Comparing the pol-
icy regime for each of the three programs with the policy regime
with no guidance provides insight in the effectiveness of the three
welfare-to-work programs. If we compare the policy regime with
10 This feature makes the design complicated for the caseworker. To remind them of
their current policy regime, we handed out forms with the policy regime preprinted.
Caseworkers were asked to fill in these forms at the intake meeting. Most caseworkers
also note the policy regime in the digital file of each individual, so that they remember
which policy regime the individual is in.
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full discretion for the caseworker with no guidance, we can assess
the added value of the combination of all services provided by the
welfare agency. To obtain insight in how well caseworkers allo-
cate programs to benefits recipients, we can compare the policy
regime of full discretion to the three policy regimes for each of the
welfare-to-work programs.
The five policy regimes are randomly allocated to caseworkers
and apply to all new welfare benefits recipients in a period of three
months. New welfare recipients are within a local office randomly
assigned to caseworkers.11 The number of caseworkers assigned to
the policy regimes is such that overall the number of participants in
the job-search activation program and in direct matching remains
similar as before the experiment. The policy regimes only apply to
new welfare recipients, and not to the existing caseload. Further-
more, caseworkers have welfare recipients who are treated under
different policy regimes at the same time. Roughly, the amount of
time that caseworkers have available for each individual in their
caseload will not vary much.12
Our setup had several advantages. Full randomization in the con-
text of welfare-to-work programs is often difficult to enforce and
raises ethical concerns. This is especially the case when evaluat-
ing existing policies (in contrast to the evaluation of additional
policies or resources) as we achieve when introducing the policy
regime nothing. The possibility to opt out in each policy regime gives
caseworkers some discretion to prevent harmful effects of the exper-
iment. This limited discretion also increased the support among
caseworkers to commit to the experiment. The risk is of course that
compliance to the policy regimes is low. We monitored this through-
out the experiment by checking data on participation in programs.
A second risk of our setup is that caseworkers exchange the wel-
fare recipients they support. We monitor this by checking if welfare
recipients meet another caseworker after the intake meeting and by
checking the forms filled in at the intake meeting. Furthermore, in
the next section we show balancing of the welfare recipients in the
different policy regimes.
3.2. Implementation
The experiment was conducted in Amsterdam from April 2012
until September 2013. On January 1, 2012, Amsterdam had 790,110
inhabitants. During the time of our experiment there was a reces-
sion in the Netherlands and unemployment was relatively high.
Within the population between 20 and 65 years old in Amsterdam,
6.4% received welfare benefits, compared to 3.1% for the whole of
the Netherlands. Inflow into welfare benefits exceeded outflow, but
at the same time the pool of applicants for welfare benefits had,
on average, relatively more favorable characteristics than in better
economic times.
The sample consists of all new welfare recipients older than
27 years that started collecting benefits between April 2012 and
March 2013 and are classified as class IV (able to find a job within six
months). The welfare agency in Amsterdam has five local offices in
which each serves different neighborhoods of the city. Benefits recip-
ients are not informed about their participation in an experiment, but
the setup of the experiment was discussed with the formal council of
welfare recipients.
Before the start of the experiment we organized meetings at all
the local offices to inform the caseworkers about their role in the
experiment. During the experiment we visited all local offices almost
11 At each local office, new welfare recipients are assigned to the caseworker with
the lowest caseload. Such random assignment allows the welfare agency to evaluate
caseworkers based on their (unconditional) realized outflow.
12 At the start of the experiment the managers promised to adjust individual
caseworker targets to the policy regime assigned to them.
weekly to answer questions of caseworkers and monitor the imple-
mentation of the experiment.13 At the start of every three-month
period we instructed each caseworker individually about the new
policy regime assigned to her. The caseworkers then also received a
new set of forms which they were required to fill in for each new wel-
fare recipient at the intake meeting. These forms were personalized
for each caseworker and had their current policy regime pre-printed
on the form, in order to remind the caseworker of their policy regime.
At one local office the manager was changed several times during
the experiment. As a result, the caseworkers at this office received
mixed instructions with respect to their participation in the exper-
iment, which affected their compliance with the experiment. For
example, the second (interim) manager explicitly instructed case-
workers to ignore the experiment to boost exit to work for the period
that she was manager. We exclude all welfare recipients from this
welfare office from the empirical analysis.14
After the experiment we administered a survey among all partic-
ipating caseworkers. At the moment of completing the survey, the
caseworkers were already informed about the main findings of the
experiment via presentations at each local office (see Table A3 in
the Appendix). The goal of this survey was to learn about choices
caseworkers make when supporting benefits recipients in their job
search. Furthermore, we wanted to have insight in the beliefs of
caseworkers about the effectiveness of the different welfare-to-work




In the empirical analysis we employ data from several sources.
First, we use administrative data from the welfare agency of Amster-
dam, with information on the start and end date of collecting welfare
benefits, exact records of all benefits payments, and an identifier for
the caseworker assigned to the benefits recipient. In addition, these
data include all contacts (meetings, phone calls and email contact)
between the caseworker and the benefits recipient and participation
in the welfare-to-work programs. The welfare agency also regis-
ters individual characteristics such as gender, date of birth, highest
obtained education and household composition.
The second data source is employment and income data
abstracted from social insurance records. These records contain
weekly information for each individual on the amount of earnings
from employment and all types of benefits payments (including wel-
fare benefits in other municipalities and benefits from other schemes
such as unemployment and disability insurance). The data on all par-
ticipants in the experiment cover the period from January 2008 until
May 2014 and allow us to construct outcomes such as earnings from
work and total income after random assignment. We exploit the ret-
rospective nature to construct control variables describing the labor
market history before entering welfare. Income from self employ-
ment is missing because self-employed workers do not participate in
social insurance schemes.
We merge the data from these two sources to data available at
Statistics Netherlands to follow individuals beyond one year after
they have applied for welfare benefits. However, the data from Statis-
tics Netherlands are less detailed than the information we have from
the social insurance records. Specifically, amounts of benefits pay-
ments and earnings are less precise and aggregated over longer time
13 Table A3 in the Appendix shows a summary of all visits that we made to the local
offices of the welfare agency during the experiment.
14 Applicants from this local office constitute 20% of the experimental sample.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of welfare recipients and balancing.
Policy regime
Counseling Activation Matching Discretion Nothing All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 36% 38% 38% 36% 38% 37%
x Partner 9% 13% 11% 10% 13% 11%
Children 10% 14% 13% 13% 10% 12%
Age (in years) 38.9 38.8 38.3 37.2** 38.9 38.4
Education (in years) 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.2
Education missing 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2%
Annual income
2 years
14.5 13.8 14.1 12.8 13.4 13.7
before (×1000 €)
N 353 333 328 394 271 1679
Note: Stars indicate that there is a significant difference with the policy regime nothing. These p-values are weighted by the office of registration, as randomization took place
within the welfare office. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
periods. Therefore, we only use these data when we look at outcomes
in the long run (three years after applying for welfare benefits).
The forms completed by caseworkers at the intake meeting are
the fourth data source. The form asks for the date of birth, gen-
der, educational level, household composition, reason of applying for
welfare, a subjective measure for the financial situation, an estimate
from the caseworker on the duration of welfare benefits dependency
and an indication which welfare-to-work programs will be offered
to the welfare recipient. This final question was included to check
whether the caseworker complied to the policy regime or used the
possibility to deviate in special cases. The forms were filled in for
73% of the welfare recipients that participated in the experiment.
Given that all crucial information is available through the admin-
istrative records (for the full sample), we only use these forms for
complementary information.
Finally, we have information from the (ex-post) survey that
was administered among the participating caseworkers. The sur-
vey includes questions on caseworker characteristics and asks their
opinion on the experiment. This survey was conducted after the
results of the evaluation were presented to the management of the
welfare agency and at all local offices. When filling in the survey
the caseworkers were familiar with the estimated effectiveness of
each of the welfare-to-work programs. In the survey we asked for
the caseworker’s beliefs on effectiveness of the different programs
and whether they changed their beliefs after the experiment. The
response rate to the survey is 81 %(50 out of 62 caseworkers that par-
ticipated in the experiment), or excluding the local office that did not
comply to the experiment 78 %(40 out of 51 caseworkers). Weighted
by the number of applicants per caseworker, the response rate is 87
%(83% excluding the non-complying welfare office), indicating that
caseworkers that assisted more welfare recipients are more likely to
complete the survey.
4.2. Descriptive statistics and balancing
During the experiment 2103 individuals that started collecting
welfare benefits in Amsterdam satisfied the criteria for participation
in our experiment (class IV and older than 27 years). A small number
of individuals experienced multiple welfare spells within the exper-
imental period, so the sample contains 2061 unique individuals. This
number is slightly lower than the inflow of 2500 individuals which
was expected prior to the experiment. From our sample we exclude
424 applications (416 unique individuals) from the local office where
compliance was low due to changing managers during the experi-
ment. Our final sample consists of 1679 spells of collecting welfare
benefits experienced by 1645 unique individuals.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample (final
column) and for each policy regime (the first five columns). The pol-
icy regime with full discretion for the caseworker has the largest
number of observations, while nothing has the fewest. In our design
we ensured that all caseworkers are observed at least once in the
policy regime with full discretion and we minimized the number of
welfare recipients without any guidance, following the request of
the welfare agency. The compositions of the five treatment groups
are well balanced. Out of 28 t-tests, there is only one significant
difference (at the five percent level) between the groups.15
Less than 40% of the welfare recipients are women, about 90 per-
cent are single and slightly over 10% have children. The average age
at starting collecting welfare benefits is 38.4 years. This is relatively
young given that we only consider individuals older than 27. The
explanation is that the entitlement period to unemployment insur-
ance benefits depends on age, so older workers who lose their job
have more time to find work before becoming dependent on welfare
benefits. On average, the individuals have slightly more than 12 years
of education. About 30% either have a bachelor or master degree
and 35% completed higher vocational education. Slightly less than
15% have only followed primary education. In the two years before
entering welfare, the average annual income was about 13,700 euro,
which is approximately the minimum wage.
5. Results
We present results in four steps. First, we provide evidence on the
effectiveness of the different policy regimes. Second, we investigate
the choices that caseworkers make within each policy regime and
use instrumental variables to estimate the effect of participating in
each welfare-to-work program. Third, we investigate heterogenous
treatment effects and study if caseworkers that specialize in a spe-
cific program get better results when applying this program. Finally,
we investigate if caseworkers learn by assessing whether they focus
on programs differently after being exposed to a different way of
working and learning about the effectiveness of the programs.
5.1. Effects of the policy regimes
Fig. 3 shows for each policy regime the percentage of individu-
als that collect welfare benefits since their moment of application.16
During the first 10 weeks after application, there are no substantial
15 The p-values are weighted by office of registration, as randomization took place
within each local office.
16 The moment of application may be earlier than the moment of eligibility for
welfare benefits. For example, the unemployment insurance administration advises
individuals who are close to exhausting unemployment insurance benefits to already
apply for welfare benefits. Also, some applications are initially incomplete and denied,
but after a reapplication the individuals may still entitle to welfare. At the initial
application, an individual is matched to a caseworker, which determines the policy
regime.














Fig. 3. Percentage of applicants receiving welfare benefits by policy regime. Note:
Data from post-experiment survey among caseworkers (response rate 81%). Case-
workers are asked to state which welfare-to-work programs they use for seven
fictional welfare recipients (numbers on the x-axis), which are described in Table A2
in the Appendix.
differences between policy regimes in the likelihood to receive ben-
efits. After that exit in the direct matching regime is slightly higher
than in the other policy regimes. After about 20 weeks differences
between policy regimes get more pronounced. From then on, out-
flow in the policy regimes with no support and job-search activation
lags behind. Between 40 and 80 weeks differences are largest, up to
almost 15 percentage points. Outflow is highest in the policy regime
with direct matching and lowest in the regime with no support. After
80 weeks the average benefits receipt in the different policy regimes
converges somewhat. However, there is still an almost 10 percent-
age points difference between direct matching and no support three
years after application.
To explore whether the observed differences in Fig. 3 are sta-
tistically significant, we estimate the following regression model:






t Ditw+Xibt +Uittw (1)
We focus on estimating the effects of the different policy regimes
on various labor market outcomes. As reference we take the pol-
icy regime with no guidance. The variable Yittw denotes the labor
market outcome of individual i observed t time periods after apply-
ing for welfare benefits at welfare office w at calendar time t. The
four different policy regimes are indicated with C (counseling), A
(activation), M (direct matching) and D (full discretion of the case-
worker on which welfare-to-work program to apply). The vector Xi
contains background characteristics including age, gender, partner
status, having children, cumulative income in the 24 months before
applying to welfare and level of education. In addition, we control
for whether the applicant received a job-search period at the time
of application for welfare benefits (for a discussion of this policy, see
Bolhaar et al. (2019)).17 The parameters att are fixed effects for the
quarter of entering welfare and account for business cycle effects.
The parameters cwt are the fixed effects for the local welfare
offices, which control for potential differences between the local
labor markets in the five city districts. Furthermore, recall that
within local offices the policy regimes are randomly assigned to
caseworkers and new welfare recipients are randomly allocated to
caseworkers. The fixed effects for the local offices are crucial to deal
with the conditional random assignment (i.e. the rates at which
17 Controlling for a job-search period does not affect our results.
policy regimes are assigned differ between local offices). In the previ-
ous subsection we showed that characteristics of welfare recipients
in the different treatment groups are balanced after weighting for
the local office.18 We estimate this model separately for different
elapsed durations t since applying for welfare benefits. The parame-
ters of interest d •t describe the effects of the different policy regimes t
weeks after entering welfare benefits. Using this empirical model, we
obtain the intention-to-treat effects (compared to the regime with
no support of the caseworker).
Fig. 4 presents the estimation results of Eq. (1) (together with the
90% confidence interval) where benefits receipt is the outcome. Out-
flow in the policy regime with job-search activation is the same as
in the policy regime without support. The policy regime with coun-
seling has a higher outflow after 30 weeks, but differences are not
significant. Differences are significant for direct matching and for full
discretion of the caseworker. These two policy regimes show very
similar patterns of outflow.19
Finding work is the most frequent reason for outflow from wel-
fare benefits, but it is not the only reason. Furthermore, individuals
who leave welfare because they find work, may lose their job again.
In Fig. 5 we show effects on having work (with positive earnings) for
each week after application to welfare benefits. The figures largely
show the reversed pattern as in Fig. 4. The main exception is that
after about 40 weeks individuals in the job-search activation regime
have a significantly lower probability to have a job with positive
earnings than in the policy regime with no support.
Welfare-to-work programs may not only affect the rate at which
work is found but can also affect the quality of the job. Job quality
is often proxied by earnings. Fig. 6 reports the effects of the policy
regimes on earnings in each week after application. Individuals with-
out a job in a particular week, have zero earnings. There are also
individuals with very flexible contracts who have some weeks with
very low earnings. Since the earnings measure is noisier than, for
example, an indicator for work, confidence intervals are wider. The
effects of direct matching and full discretion are no longer signifi-
cant, which suggests that many people find low paying jobs. This is in
agreement with the observation that trial periods and wage subsidies
are often necessary to convince employers to hire welfare recipients.
Most striking is the negative effect of the job-search activation
regime on earnings, which already becomes negative after about
13 weeks. The job-search activation program was originally designed
for workers in lower classes (with a larger distance to the labor
market). The focus is largely on finding employment via temp work
agencies. Because there were not enough welfare recipients in the
lower classes satisfying the participation criteria, the job-search acti-
vation was also made available for welfare recipients in class IV. Our
results suggest that jobs in the temp work sector are not the best
match for welfare recipients in class IV.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows the effects on total income, which is the sum
of welfare benefits, earnings and income from other types of benefits.
This figure confirms the earlier findings. The higher job finding in the
regimes with direct matching and full discretion does not translate
in higher income for the welfare recipient. The earnings in most jobs
do not exceed the benefits level. Job-search activation significantly
reduces total income. The most likely explanation is that individu-
als who exit the welfare benefits system get flexible contracts in the
temp work sector which often provide too few hours of work in a
week to earn more than the welfare benefits level. Counseling has
zero effects on total income.
18 Since a small fraction of the applicants appear twice in the data we cluster
standard errors at the level of the individual welfare applicant.
19 We have also looked at the effects of the policy regimes on the amount of wel-
fare benefits payments, to take both full and partial benefits receipt into account. The
results for this outcome are very similar to the results for any benefit receipt.
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Fig. 4. Effects of policy regimes on receiving welfare benefits (0/1). Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (1). Included controls are calendar time
fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
Based on the intention-to-treat effects of the policy regimes on
labor market outcomes, there are a few things that we can conclude.
First, the policy regimes in which caseworkers have unrestricted
access to direct matching (direct matching and full discretion) per-
form significantly better than no support by caseworkers with both
higher exit from welfare and higher job finding. Second, if case-
workers target programs optimally in the policy regime with full
discretion, this policy regime should outperform all other programs.
Based on the results in the previous section, this does not seem
the case as the policy regime with direct matching performs at
least as good. Third, the policy regime counseling does not lead to
a higher outflow out of welfare benefits or higher earnings, com-
pared to no support. Finally, the encouragement to participate in the
job-search activation program, makes labor market outcomes signif-
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Fig. 5. Effects of policy regimes on having a job (0/1). Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (1). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects,
local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies
for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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Fig. 6. Effects of policy regimes on earnings. Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (1). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local office
fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for five
education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
5.2. Caseworker compliance and instrumental variables results
The results presented so far are intention-to-treat effects com-
paring the policy regimes to the policy regime without support.
Compliance to the policy regimes is not perfect due to three rea-
sons. First, caseworkers were given the option to deviate from the
approach described in the policy regime. Second, in some cases
welfare recipients did not satisfy the criteria for participating in a
welfare-to-work program (e.g. language and computer skills for job-
search activation). And third, some welfare recipients found work
quickly, so before the support of the caseworker could have started.
Table 3 shows which welfare-to-work programs were applied in the
different policy regimes. The numbers in each column do not add
up to one, as an individual can participate in multiple programs. In
addition to the three welfare-to-work programs (counseling, direct
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Fig. 7. Effects of policy regimes on total income. Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (1). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local
office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for
five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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Table 3
Actual program participation in the different policy regimes.
Policy regime
Nothing Counseling Activation Matching Discretion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No support 84% 23% 21% 29% 29%
Welfare-to-work program:
Counseling 10% 70% 47% 49% 55%
Job-search activation 3% 6% 36% 4% 8%
Direct matching 10% 30% 27% 50% 36%
Job-hunter 2% 10% 8% 8% 10%
Other 4% 10% 19% 18% 14%
Contacts with caseworker 0.73 1.07 1.02 1.16 0.96
(monthly)
N 271 353 333 328 394
we also distinguish ‘job-hunter’ and ‘other’. The job-hunter is a pro-
gram that was first introduced when our experiment was already
running.20 We could, therefore, not include it in the description of
the policy regimes. The same holds for some small and very specific
welfare-to-work programs that are included in the category ‘other’.
The first thing to note in Table 3 is that compliance to the pol-
icy regime nothing is high. About 84% of the welfare recipients in
this policy regime did not receive any support from their caseworker.
This percentage is much higher than in the other policy regimes,
where no support is often associated with individuals who exit wel-
fare quickly.21 Also the newly introduced programs (job-hunter and
other) were less frequently provided to welfare recipients in the
policy regime without guidance.
Looking at the other policy regimes, we see that the random
assignment of the policy regimes largely increased usage of the
encouraged programs compared to the regime with no support. The
increase in the encouraged program use is 60, 30 and 40 percentage
points for respectively counseling, job-search activation and direct
matching. Interesting to note is how caseworkers allocate welfare-
to-work programs in case they have full discretion, which is shown
in the fifth column in Table 3. In that case about 30% of the wel-
fare recipients do not receive any support, 55% receive counseling,
less than 10% participate in the job-search activation program and
direct matching is applied to 36 %. Each program is used less than
in case of the policy regimes with encouragement for the program,
but each program is used much more than in the policy regime with-
out any support. The program choice in the policy regime with full
discretion has quite some similarities with direct matching, maybe
with the exception that the job-search activation program is used
twice as frequent and direct matching somewhat less frequent. If
we also take the job-hunter and other programs into account, wel-
fare recipients that do receive support, on average, participate in two
welfare-to-work programs.
The bottom row of Table 3 shows the average number of times
that the caseworker contacts the welfare recipient per month under
the different policy regimes. Under no guidance, the caseworkers had
less contact with the applicant than under the other policy regimes.
The number of meetings under no guidance is not zero because
the caseworkers occasionally have to meet their clients in order to
20 A job-hunter is a person (not the caseworker) that has to acquire vacancies and
find suitable welfare recipients to fill these vacancies. As such, it is somewhat simi-
lar to the instrument direct matching, the difference being that the initiative for the
match comes from the job-hunter instead of from the caseworker/welfare recipient
and that the job-hunter does not use trial periods or wage subsidies.
21 Fig. A1 in the Appendix shows the likelihood to receive no guidance against the
months until exiting welfare. For all policy regimes excluding no guidance, more than
60 percent of the individuals that exit welfare within two months after registration
receive no guidance. This reduces to around ten percent conditional on exit after ten
months. Only for the policy regime nothing the percentage of individuals without
support is consistently around 80%.
discuss the technical aspects of their benefits payments. However,
we asked the caseworkers in this policy regime not to be proactive
towards the benefits recipient with respect to job coaching.
To learn more about the added value of the various welfare-to-
work programs, we apply an instrumental variables approach. We
regress the outcome Yittw of individual i observed t periods after
applying for welfare benefits at local office w at calendar time t, on
actual participation in counseling (C̃itw), job-search activation (Ãitw)
and direct matching (M̃itw)
Yittw = att + cwt + dct C̃itw + d
a
t Ãitw + d
m
t M̃itw + Xibt + Uittw (2)
Since actual participation in a program is selective, we use the
randomly assigned policy regimes as instrumental variables, which
gives the first-stage regression equations,
C̃itw = jct + k
c
w + x
ccCitw + xcaAitw + xcmMitw + xcdDitw + Xi0c + Vcitw
Ãitw = jat + k
a
w + x
acCitw + xaaAitw + xamMitw + xadDitw + Xi0a + Vaitw
M̃itw = jmt + k
m
w + x
mcCitw + xmaAitw + xmmMitw + xmdDitw + Xi0m + Vmitw
(3)
Since there are five policy regimes, we have four instrumental vari-
ables, while there are only three welfare-to-work programs. Above
we showed that there are substantial differences in how frequent
the difference programs are used in each policy regime. This is also
reflected in the first-stage regressions which show significant dif-
ferences in program participation between the policy regimes (see
Table A4 in the Appendix). In all specifications the F-statistic for
joint significance of the policy regimes on the uptake of the different
programs are sufficiently high.
Most programs start between eight and 16 weeks, but some
welfare recipients start a program later. This means that the clas-
sification of an individual as never taker, complier or always taker
can depend on the realized period of welfare benefits receipt.22 If
the policy regimes not only affect the participation in programs but
also the moment of starting the program, the instrumental vari-
ables estimates are biased away from zero and defining compliers
is more complicated. Furthermore, to interpret the estimated effects
from the instrumental variables approach usually a monotonicity
22 Consider, for example, an individual who benefits a lot from direct matching. If
this individual is assigned to the policy regime with direct matching, she will enter
direct matching quickly and find work quickly. If this individual is assigned to another
policy regime, she may at a much later stage of the benefits period still participate in
direct matching and then find work. This specific individual would be an always taker,
but the potential treated outcomes depend on the policy regime.
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Table 4
Effects of policy regimes and program participation on cumulative labor market outcomes 52 weeks after application.
Weeks on welfare Weeks worked Earnings Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy regimes (ITT)
Counseling -0.95 -1.26 0.18 0.36 -633 -806 -319 -703
(1.46) (1.36) (1.57) (1.59) (683) (679) (614) (605)
Activation -0.23 -0.76 -2.10 -2.05 -1793*** -1932*** -1521*** -1798***
(1.50) (1.40) (1.58) (1.58) (654) (638) (587) (575)
Matching -2.34 -2.67* 2.35 2.06 262 -155 159 -315
(1.50) (1.41) (1.60) (1.63) (693) (676) (608) (597)
Discretion -1.76 -3.14** 1.70 2.03 -240 -248 -455 -777
(1.42) (1.34) (1.56) (1.58) (655) (642) (577) (572)
Programs (LATE)
Counseling 0.12 -0.14 -1.58 -0.93 -1535 -1377 -775 -1054
(2.93) (2.62) (3.14) (2.97) (1307) (1194) (1175) (1067)
Activation 1.86 1.05 -8.04** -7.97** -4726*** -4634*** -4331*** -4235***
(3.87) (3.55) (4.00) (3.84) (1514) (1380) (1426) (1308)
Matching -6.76 -7.82* 8.81* 7.17 2392 1326 963 121
(4.95) (4.48) (5.25) (5.01) (2147) (1935) (1899) (1721)
Observations 1679 1549 1679 1549 1679 1549 1679 1549
Note: The top panel is based on Eq. (1); the lower panel follows Eq. (2). Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) are based on the full sample, while columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are conditional on
the applicant being on welfare for at least eight weeks. Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the applicant). ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
assumption is made (Angrist et al., 1996).23 Monotonicity assumes
that when the policy regime changes, program participation can
either only increase or decrease. Finally, since we have four instru-
mental variables and only three welfare-to-work programs, the IV
estimates for each welfare-to-work program describe a mix of com-
pliers. For example, the IV estimate for activation relates to both
compliers to the police regimes activation and to the policy regime
caseworker discretion.24 These limitations should be kept in mind
when interpreting the estimated effects from the instrumental vari-
ables approach as local average treatment effects (LATE).
Table 4 shows the intention-to-treat effects (upper panel) and
local average treatment effects (lower panel) for cumulative out-
comes 52 weeks after registration.25 The table shows the estimated
effects for the full sample (odd columns) and for the subsample that
collects welfare benefits for at least eight weeks (even columns).
This sample selection should not affect the estimated local average
treatment effects but will increase compliance (see Table A4 in the
Appendix). Individuals who leave the benefits system within eight
weeks usually do not participate in programs and are thus never
takers.
The intention-to-treat effects confirm the earlier findings, the job-
search activation regime significantly reduces earnings and income
and for direct matching and full discretion exit from welfare benefits
increases. The local average treatment effects show that participation
in the job-search activation program increases the welfare benefits
period only very modestly, but reduces the weeks worked substan-
tially. This causes that participants in this program experience more
weeks without any income, which significantly reduces total earn-
ings and total income. The job-search activation program seems ill
suited for the welfare recipients in our experiment, which have rel-
atively favorable labor market prospects among welfare recipients.
We explain the latter from the relatively long waiting period to enter
the activation program and the strong focus on the temp work sector,
which is more often found not to be a stepping stone for unemployed
23 We maintain the assumption that within local offices applicants are randomly
assigned to policy regimes (exogeneity). This assumption has been discussed above
and is satisfied by the experimental design.
24 Note that this also means that the sign of the intention-to-treat effects is not
necessarily the same as the sign of the local average treatment effect.
25 Figs. A2–A5 in the Appendix show the instrumental variable results by week since
application.
job seekers (Autor and Houseman, 2010; Van der Klaauw and Ziegler,
2019). Participation in direct matching causes that individuals col-
lect welfare benefits for fewer weeks and have more weeks of paid
work. Although not significantly, cumulative earnings and cumula-
tive income both increase. Counseling does not have any positive
effects on job findings and earnings. This suggests that without
providing vacancies the assistance of caseworkers is not very useful.
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 4 show the results when
we restrict the sample to individuals who receive welfare benefits
for at least eight weeks. As expected (because we mainly exclude
never takers) the results for this restricted sample are very similar
to the full sample results. Finally, Table A5 in the Appendix presents
the estimates for cumulative outcomes three years after registration.
These estimates are obtained using data from Statistics Netherlands
and show that the estimated effects after 52 weeks are persistent and
even become somewhat larger. As mentioned earlier, the data from
Statistics Netherlands are noisier and more aggregated over time
periods. Given the similarity of the results we will focus mainly on
the first 52 weeks in the remainder of the paper.
5.3. Heterogeneity by welfare recipient, local office and caseworker
In the previous subsection we provided average effects. How-
ever, participation in a welfare-to-work program may have different
effects for welfare recipients with different characteristics. Between
local offices the policy to assign welfare recipients to the various pro-
grams may differ and also within local offices caseworkers may have
different approaches. This causes that samples of compliers differ
between caseworkers and local offices. In this subsection we focus
on heterogeneity in program effects and investigate if caseworkers
allocate welfare recipients to programs based on these observables
when they have discretion.
To investigate heterogeneity in the program effects, we con-
struct a vulnerability index, that ranks individuals based on the first
component of a principal component analysis using a rich set of pre-
experiment covariates.26 The vulnerability index is normalized such
26 The components are earnings in the two years before registration, welfare benefits
in the two years before application, four dummies for different age categories, gender,
partner, children, the reason for entry into welfare benefits, eight dummies for level of
education, financial situation, low self-reliance and the expected number of months it
will take to find a job, where the last three components are based on reports by the
caseworker.
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that it runs from zero to one. As can be seen from the estimation
results this index is a strong predictor of labor market outcomes.
Table 5 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects. Again, the
upper panel contains the intention-to-treat effects and the lower
panel the local average treatment effects. The intention-to-treat
effects show some evidence that the most vulnerable individuals suf-
fer most from being assigned to the policy regime without support.
There is, however, no strong evidence for heterogeneous treatment
effects. We only find marginally significant estimates showing that
participation in the job-search activation program does not have
adverse earnings and income effects for the most vulnerable welfare
recipients. This is in agreement with the original intention of the job-
search activation program to assist the more disadvantaged welfare
recipients in their job search.
Table 6 shows how often caseworkers in the four local offices
use the different programs in the full discretion regime compared to
the regime without support, by vulnerability of the applicant. These
estimates can be considered as part of the first-stage regressions in
the instrumental variables approach and are indicative of whether
caseworkers allocate programs based on the observed characteris-
tics of the applicant when they have discretion. The regressions show
that under full discretion the more vulnerable welfare recipients get
more support in the local offices in North and South/West and less
Table 5
Effects of policy regimes and program participation on cumulative labor market
outcomes by vulnerability of the applicant.
Weeks on welfare Weeks worked Earnings Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy regimes (ITT)
Counseling 4.91 −3.70 −1996 −871
(3.65) (3.96) (1794) (1550)
Activation 1.58 −8.48** −4495** −3598**
(3.81) (4.05) (1768) (1562)
Matching 1.45 −1.87 −410 678
(3.69) (4.06) (1862) (1608)
Discretion 1.45 −2.68 −1937 −1386
(3.59) (3.96) (1780) (1575)
Counseling X vuln. −12.19* 7.21 2419 884
(6.96) (7.95) (3139) (2752)
Activation X vuln. −3.53 13.65* 5808* 4518
(7.00) (7.85) (3069) (2773)
Matching X vuln. −8.05 9.02 1381 −1193
(6.95) (7.85) (3233) (2855)
Discretion X vuln. −6.67 9.19 3556 1958
(6.72) (7.62) (3044) (2747)
Vulnerability index 18.42*** −20.03*** −8404*** −4366**
(5.55) (6.34) (2534) (2188)
Programs (LATE)
Counseling 12.90 −8.01 −6525 −5105
(11.12) (11.99) (5557) (4857)
Activation −7.39 −24.84* −14048** −14445**
(14.39) (15.07) (6588) (6195)
Matching −8.41 5.25 7023 8780
(16.94) (18.56) (8368) (7316)
Counseling X vuln. −24.76 11.67 9325 8220
(20.22) (22.37) (9613) (8462)
Activation X vuln. 16.97 34.25 19487* 21106**
(24.18) (26.08) (10803) (10392)
Matching X vuln. 2.19 10.14 −8255 −15309
(32.36) (36.09) (15115) (13459)
Vulnerability index 21.68*** −23.41*** −8666** −3574
(7.80) (9.00) (3556) (3138)
Observations 1679 1679 1679 1679
Note: The top panel is based on Eq. (1) while the lower panel follows Eq. (2). The policy
regimes (treatments) are interacted with the continuous vulnerability index, where a
higher index corresponds to higher vulnerability. Included controls are calendar time
fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registra-
tion and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
Table 6
Effects on program participation of being assigned to full discretion compared to





Discretion 0.16 −0.00 0.16
(0.14) (0.08) (0.17)
Discretion X vuln. 0.88*** 0.01 0.36
(0.26) (0.19) (0.34)
Office Center/East:
Discretion 0.67*** 0.12** 0.32***
(0.13) (0.06) (0.10)
Discretion X vuln. −0.62** −0.12 −0.24
(0.28) (0.12) (0.22)
Office New West:
Discretion 0.19 0.27** −0.05
(0.23) (0.12) (0.21)
Discretion X vuln. −0.06 −0.60* −0.19
(0.48) (0.34) (0.47)
Office South/West:
Discretion 0.33** 0.00 0.52***
(0.16) (0.08) (0.15)
Discretion X vuln. 0.69** 0.13 −0.09
(0.30) (0.17) (0.30)
Note: This table reports the first stage estimates by welfare office for the effect of
the policy regime discretion on treatment uptake following Eq. (3), where all pol-
icy regimes included and are interacted with the continuous vulnerability index. A
higher vulnerability index corresponds to higher vulnerability. The number of obser-
vations by welfare office are 303 (North), 534 (Center/East), 272 (New West) and
570 (South/West). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed
effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composi-
tion, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for five
education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
support in Center/East and New West. In the latter two offices, case-
workers are also more likely to apply job-search activation to less
vulnerable applicants. Both actions are opposite to what would be
recommended based on the results from Table 5.
The results indicate that the different local offices employ differ-
ent policies towards supporting welfare recipients when they have
full discretion. For example, North and South/West hardly apply job-
search activation and New West almost never uses direct matching.
These results show that in the usual regime welfare recipients are
likely to get different support in different local offices. Of course, this
can also (partly) reflect that local labor markets and populations of
welfare recipients differ between local offices.
Differences in how programs are applied are stronger between
caseworkers than between local offices. Fig. 8 shows for each case-
worker the fraction of welfare recipients that participate in a par-
ticular program in the policy regime of full discretion. There is
substantial dispersion between caseworkers in how often they assign
welfare recipients to the different welfare-to-work programs. For
example, some caseworkers almost never use direct matching while
others use it for the majority of their welfare recipients. Overall
rates of use for the job-search activation are low and many case-
workers never assign welfare recipients to this training, but a few
caseworkers very often assign welfare recipients to this program.
We use the information from Fig. 8 to define specialization by
caseworkers. In particular, we distinguish between caseworkers who
use a welfare-to-work program more or less frequent than the mean
of all caseworkers. Next, we interact the indicator for frequent use
with the assigned policy regime. This provides insight in whether
caseworkers that specialize in a particular welfare-to-work program
obtain better outcomes with this program. It is not ex-ante clear
if specialization is positive or not. Caseworkers that specialize may
become better in using a program, but they may also assign too many
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Fig. 8. Fraction of welfare recipients that participate in each welfare-to-work program by caseworker in full discretion regime.
welfare recipients to this program and do not obtain enough infor-
mation about the other available programs. It is thus an empirical
question how the effects of programs differ between caseworkers
that specialize and do not specialize.
Table 7 presents the estimated local average treatment effects
of participating in the different welfare-to-work programs on the
different cumulative labor market outcomes (in the year after appli-
cation). The rows labeled with ‘low use’ provide the effects for
caseworkers that have a low use of the program under full discre-
tion, while the rows with ‘high use’ present the estimated effects for
caseworkers with an above average use of the program. The estima-
tion results do not provide evidence that the effect of participating
in a program depends on how much experience the caseworker has
with the program. The estimated effects of the low-use and high-use
caseworkers are similar and never significantly different from each
other.
Our experimental design would have the potential to estimate
many marginal treatment effects, because caseworkers behave dif-
ferently in case of full discretion and respond differently to the
encouraged policy regimes.27 Therefore, each caseworker generates
estimated effects for a different population of compliers. However,
for a caseworker the number of welfare recipients in each policy
regime is not very large and the results above show that estimated
effects do not vary much by program use (and thus compliance) of
the caseworker. This suggests that the marginal treatment effects
do not vary much. In addition, our experiment lacks the statistical
power to identify small variations in the marginal treatment effects.
Instead of estimating marginal treatment effects we test if the
effects of participating in a program differ between welfare recipi-
ents who are likely to participate in programs and unlikely to partic-
ipate in programs. The first group would include individuals on the
margin of being a never taker or a complier, while the second group
would include individuals on the margin of being an always taker or
complier. We construct an index describing expected program use
during the period of welfare benefits receipt and split the sample
27 This would make the additional assumption that the caseworker does not have a
direct effect on the labor market outcomes of welfare recipients.
into welfare recipients with above and below median expected pro-
gram participation. Next, we estimate the effects of participating in
the different programs for both groups. The estimates are shown in
Table 8. The results provide some weak indication that individuals
who are likely to get many treatments suffer less from participating
in the job-search activation program and benefit (in terms of hav-
ing work instead of benefits) from direct matching. This coincides
with the earlier findings using the vulnerability index. The vulner-
ability index correlates with expect program participation because
both describe individuals who are likely to collect welfare benefits
for a longer period.
5.4. Caseworker learning
Above we showed that effects of participation differ between
welfare-to-work programs, but the effectiveness of a welfare-to-
work program does not depend on the caseworker. Still, caseworkers
often have a very different approach when supporting welfare recip-
ients. In particular, in the usual policy regime they have substantial
discretion and they use this to focus on different welfare-to-work
programs. Our experiment forced caseworkers to change their usual
approach and to also consider other welfare-to-work programs when
supporting welfare recipients. Furthermore, the experiment pro-
vides insight in the effectiveness of the different programs, which
was not systematically collected before. In this subsection we study
if caseworkers respond to this by changing their attitudes for sup-
porting welfare recipients.
After the experiment and also after we had presented results to
the management and caseworkers at the local offices, we conducted
a survey among caseworkers. In the survey we asked caseworkers
to answer for each of the welfare-to-work programs ‘Compared to
before the experiment, have you changed your belief about to the
usefulness of the program’. Caseworkers answered these questions
on a scale from 0 to 100 where we indicated less useful (<50) no
change (50) and more useful (>50). The results, which are sum-
marized in Table 9, do not concur with our empirical findings. In
particular, 43% of the caseworkers believe that direct matching is less
useful, while we find it to be the most effective instrument. Simi-
larly, 47% of the caseworkers report that counseling is more useful
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Table 7
Effects of participating in the welfare-to-work programs on cumulative labor market outcomes by caseworker specialization (instrumental variables estimation).
Weeks on welfare Weeks worked Total earnings Total income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Counseling:
Low use caseworker −0.56 −3.84 −2327 −837
(5.18) (5.51) (2150) (1843)
High use caseworker 0.42 −2.55 −1923 −1054
(3.09) (3.36) (1367) (1198)
Activation:
Low use caseworker 0.81 −7.54 −3009 −1776
(6.29) (6.64) (2420) (2224)
High use caseworker 2.01 −6.69 −4134*** −3558**
(4.02) (4.27) (1597) (1483)
Matching:
Low use caseworker −11.87 17.69* 5709 2631
(8.46) (9.24) (3646) (3004)
High use caseworker −8.38 13.61** 3981* 2178
(5.15) (5.65) (2266) (1926)
Note: The two rows under the name of each policy regime represent each one regression including the interaction of the relevant policy regime with the low or high use indicator.
Included controls are the low or high use indicator, indicators for the other policy regimes, calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age
at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
Table 8
Effects of participating in the welfare-to-work programs on cumulative labor market outcomes by likelihood to receive many treatments.
Weeks on welfare Weeks worked Total earnings Total income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Counseling:
Low exp. nr treatments −1.41 −2.32 −2383 −1237
(4.63) (4.89) (2084) (1913)
High exp. nr treatments 2.22 −0.97 −1311 −771
(3.64) (3.98) (1658) (1490)
Activation:
Low exp. nr treatments 1.71 −13.58 −6031* −6718**
(8.20) (8.54) (3321) (3184)
High exp. nr treatments 1.25 −5.62 −3758*** −3109**
(3.85) (3.91) (1463) (1392)
Matching:
Low exp. nr treatments −4.47 4.02 3669 3819
(7.93) (8.38) (3715) (3279)
High exp. nr treatments −10.45** 10.71* 2305 −214
(5.48) (5.93) (2359) (2100)
Note: The two rows under the name of each policy regime represent each one IV regression including the interaction of the relevant policy regime with the indicator for low or
high expected number of treatments. Included controls are the low or high expected number of treatments indicator, indicators for the other policy regimes, calendar time fixed
effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and
dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
than they thought before the experiment, even though we find that
counseling does not outperform providing no support. Finally, 29%
answer that the job-search activation program is more useful, a pro-
gram that we find to be not only non-effective, but also harmful to
having work and total income of the welfare recipient.
Next, we asked caseworkers in the survey if they actually changed
their usual approach of supporting welfare recipients in their job
search.28 In particular, we asked them about their use of each
welfare-to-work program in relation to before the experiment. The
answers are again on a scale from 0 to 100, which we categorized as
less use (<50), no change (50) in use and more use (>50). The results
are presented in Table 10. The tendency is to intensify the use of
welfare-to-work programs, and in particular counseling. The results
also show that more caseworkers want to use job-search activation
more often than less frequently, and direct matching is mentioned
most often as program that will be used less frequently.
When asked whether the caseworkers found the experiment use-
ful only five out of 50 answered negatively. The responses to the
survey indicate that a majority of the caseworkers provide support
28 Due to data limitations we do not observe the welfare-to-work programs that
caseworkers applied after the experimental period.
differently after the experiment. However, the caseworkers do not
use empirical evidence to update their beliefs about the welfare-to-
work programs. Their answers about the effectiveness of programs
and their intended use are not aligned with our empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of the different programs. A likely explanation is
that due to the experiment caseworkers learn about other character-
istics of the welfare-to-work programs which they value more than
effectiveness. For example, some caseworkers indicated that they do
not like direct matching because it provides fully subsidized labor to
employers, who have only limited commitment.
Table 9
Perceived effectiveness of different programs compared to beliefs prior to the experi-
ment.
Less useful No change More useful
(1) (2) (3)
Counseling 19% 33% 47%
Job-search activation 34% 37% x29%
Direct matching 43% 11% 46%
N 36
Note: The information in this table is based on the post-experiment survey among the
caseworkers that participated in the experiment. The response rate to the survey is
81%.
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Table 10
Use of different programs compared to before the experiment.
Use less No change Use more
(1) (2) (3)
Counseling 11% 33% 56%
Job-search activation 23% 46% 31%
Direct matching 31% 34% 34%
N 36
Note: The information in this table is based on the post-experiment survey among the
caseworkers that participated in the experiment. The response rate to the survey is
81%.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we study the role of the caseworker in the assign-
ment and take-up of active labor market programs. We conduct
a field experiment where five different policy regimes are ran-
domly assigned to caseworkers and welfare recipients are ran-
domly assigned to caseworkers. We find that direct matching to
vacancies is effective in increasing exit from benefits by help-
ing welfare recipients to find paid work. Participation in the job-
search activation program makes labor market outcomes signif-
icantly worse than giving no guidance to the welfare recipient.
We do not find strong evidence in favor of heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. The more disadvantaged welfare recipients benefit
somewhat more from participation in the welfare-to-work pro-
grams, but program participation effects do not vary between case-
worker. Still, we find substantial differences in the use of programs
between local offices and even more between caseworkers. Our
post-experimental survey shows that some caseworkers continue
focusing on job-search activation, even after being informed that it
has adverse consequences on the labor market prospects of benefits
recipients.
Our findings imply that even when there is credible knowledge
about the effectiveness of certain active labor market programs, the
roll-out of such a program is not obvious. Caseworkers have sub-
stantial discretion, and do not easily change behavior. This finding
confirms earlier results of Behncke et al. (2009) and Schmieder and
Trenkle (2016). While in their case caseworkers were only provided
with small incentives to change behavior, we show that this is still
the case if caseworkers are provided with extensive information
about the effectiveness of different programs and experience the use
of these programs. As a response, benefits agencies can formulate
policy regimes to reduce discretion, for example by shutting down
some active labor market programs completely or enforcing manda-
tory participation for some groups of benefits recipients. But even in
such regimes the heterogeneity of benefits recipients requires some
discretion for caseworkers. Overall, our results show that learning
which active labor market programs are effective is not enough to
increase the use of these programs.
A. Appendix
Table A1
Benefit levels (net, in €per month).
Housing costs
Full Shared None
Single without children 935.80 802.12 668.43
Single with children 1203.19 1069.50 935.81
Couple without children 1336.87 1203.19 1069.50
Couple with children 1336.87 1203.19 1069.50
Note: Benefit levels in period July 1 to December 31 in 2012, including holiday
allowance. Benefit levels outside this time frame differ only marginally. Shared hous-
ing costs apply if the costs are shared with an individual that is not the partner or the
child.
Table A2
Description of the seven fictional clients in the post-experiment survey.
Name Description
Person 1 A married man of 50 years old. He has limited
command of Dutch, and only finished primary
school.
Person 2 A woman of 38 years old. She is divorced and has
two children aged four and seven. Her
ex-partner refuses to pay the alimony, so she
hardly manages to make ends meet. She has
little work experience.
Person 3 A single man of 33 years old. The past few years
he only had temporary jobs. He only followed
preparatory vocational education, but never
finished his vocational degree.
Person 4 A highly educated woman of 51 years old. She
has a lot of work experience and has never relied
on welfare benefits before. She has made a lot of
job applications, but is continuously rejected.
Person 5 A man of 45 years old. He applies for welfare
benefits because his shop went bankrupt. He
wants to have a regular job and has already
deregistered as self-employed at the chamber of
commerce (Kamer van Koophandel).
Person 6 A single woman of 32 years old. She has a lot of
debts, rent, phone bills, health insurance, mail
order companies, etc. At the first meeting she
arrives late.
Person 7 A single man of 29 years old. He graduated last
year and traveled afterwards. Now he is looking
for his dream job.
Table A3
Log of visits to the local welfare offices.
Name Description
March 2012 Information meetings at welfare offices.
March 2012 Visits and collection of forms.
April 2012 Information meetings at welfare offices.
April 2012 Visits and collection of forms.
April - May 2012 Sit in with caseworker meetings, visits and
collection of forms at all welfare offices.
May 2012 Visit to statistical office, first data delivery.
June 2012 Handout of new default options at all welfare
offices.
June 2012 Progress report to all team managers.
July 2012 Visit and collection of forms at all welfare offices.
September 2012 Handout of new default options and collection of
forms all welfare offices.
November–December 2012 Presentation of progress experiment at all
welfare offices.
December 2012 Handout of new default options and lists of
missing forms at all welfare offices.
January 2013 Collection of forms and completed lists of
missing forms at all welfare offices.
February 2013 Collection of forms at all welfare offices.
March 2013 Collection of forms at all welfare offices.
April 1, 2013 End of experiment.
April 2013 Second data delivery.
April–May 2013 Presentation of (preliminary) results at all
welfare offices.
October 2013 Survey sent out to all participating caseworkers.
November 2013 Sample of the experiment matched with data
from the social security administration.
February 2014 Presentation of final report (incl. results of the
survey). Policy makers, management teams and
caseworkers invited.
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Table A4
First-stage effects of default options on treatment uptake.
Treatments
Counseling Activation Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy regimes
Counseling 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.01 0.01 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Activation 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Matching 0.40*** 0.43*** -0.01 -0.01 0.37*** 0.40***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Discretion 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
F-statistic 114.9 123.8 37.4 35.7 34.0 34.9
Observations 1679 1549 1679 1549 1679 1549
Note: This table reports the first stage estimates for the effect of the policy regimes on treatment uptake following Eq. (3). Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) are based on the full sample,
while columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are conditional on the applicant being on welfare for at least eight weeks. The policy regime with no support is the base category. Included
controls are calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24
months before registration and dummies for five education categories). The F-statistics describe joint significance of the instrumental variables in each first-stage regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
Table A5
Effects of policy regimes on cumulative labor market outcomes three years after application (data from Statistics Netherlands).
Weeks on welfare Weeks worked Total earnings Total income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy regimes (ITT)
Counseling −9.03** −0.91 −210 −1230
(4.41) (4.20) (1642) (1259)
Activation −2.07 0.76 −1857 −1597
(4.40) (4.26) (1611) (1239)
Matching −10.99** 4.80 2645 647
(4.37) (4.18) (1670) (1314)
Discretion −8.88** 4.48 525 −1345
(4.28) (4.08) (1544) (1157)
Programs (LATE)
Counseling −9.98 −6.75 −3175 −3701
(8.99) (8.41) (3359) (2590)
Activation 13.72 1.91 −6470 −2947
(11.58) (11.13) (4158) (3256)
Matching −18.91 22.97* 10102* 4710
(14.79) (13.95) (5650) (4488)
Observations 1679 1679 1679 1679
Note:The top panel is based on Eq. (1); the lower panel follows Eq. (2). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age
at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
Fig. A1. No instrument applied to client, by duration of the benefits spell.
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Fig. A2. Effects (IV) of treatments on receiving welfare benefits (0/1). Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (2). Included controls are calendar time
fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
Fig. A3. Effects (IV) of treatments on having a job (0/1). Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (2). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects,
local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies
for five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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Fig. A4. Effects (IV) of treatments on earnings. Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following equation (2). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local
office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for
five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
Fig. A5. Effects (IV) of treatments on total income. Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following Eq. (2). Included controls are calendar time fixed effects, local
office fixed effects and applicant characteristics (age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies for
five education categories). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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